[图书][B] Game-theoretical models in biology

M Broom, J Rychtář - 2022 - taylorfrancis.com
Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology,
Second Edition presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological …

Bayes and Darwin: How replicator populations implement Bayesian computations

D Czégel, H Giaffar, JB Tenenbaum, E Szathmáry - Bioessays, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
Bayesian learning theory and evolutionary theory both formalize adaptive competition
dynamics in possibly high‐dimensional, varying, and noisy environments. What do they …

Multidimensional convergence stability

O Leimar - Evolutionary Ecology Research, 2009 - evolutionary-ecology.com
Multidimensional convergence stability Page 1 Multidimensional convergence stability Olof
Leimar Department of Zoology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden ABSTRACT …

Population games and deterministic evolutionary dynamics

WH Sandholm - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2015 - Elsevier
Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small,
anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents …

Evolutionary game theory: ESS, convergence stability, and NIS

J Apaloo, JS Brown, TL Vincent - Evolutionary Ecology …, 2009 - evolutionary-ecology.com
Question: How are the three main stability concepts from evolutionary game theory–
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), convergence stability, and neighbourhood invader …

Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics: the continuous strategy case

J Hofbauer, J Oechssler, F Riedel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of
zero sum games with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these …

Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

G Jäger, LP Metzger, F Riedel - Games and economic behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of
infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In …

Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space

MW Cheung - Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
This paper studies imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space. We define
imitative dynamics—which include the replicator dynamic as a special case—as …

[HTML][HTML] Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets

S Perkins, DS Leslie - Journal of Economic Theory, 2014 - Elsevier
Continuous action space games are ubiquitous in economics. However, whilst learning
dynamics in normal form games with finite action sets are now well studied, it is not until …

The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

R Lahkar, F Riedel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2015 - Elsevier
We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets and establish its
fundamental properties, namely, the existence of a logit equilibrium, its convergence to a …