Over the past several decades, legislators and regulators have increasingly turned to
disclosure schemes, rather than substantive regulation, to accomplish regulatory goals. Most …

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally
test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We …

This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impact of conventional arbitration and
final-offer arbitration (FOA) when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In this …

The economic analysis of procedure reduces most issues to direct costs and error costs.
Direct costs are ordinary litigation costs. Error costs are the reduction in deterrence and the …

We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the
framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining …

We present an experimental analysis of the signaling and screening models of litigation. In
both models, bargaining failure is driven by asymmetric information. The difference between …

Abstract In Final Offer Arbitration, both parties submit a proposal to an arbitrator. In the event
the parties cannot reach a negotiated settlement, the arbitrator chooses the submitted …

We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly
disclosure of private information in a signaling game. Under the theory, 100% of plaintiffs …

We conduct an experimental analysis of discovery in both the signaling and screening
games, where in both games an uninformed defendant may engage in costly discovery …

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally
test the conditions under which conflict can be resolved via a random device. We model …