Y Kamada, T Sugaya - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020 - academic.oup.com
We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along …
Y Kamada, M Kandori - Harvard University, 2009 - crepe.eu-tokyo.ac.jp
This paper illustrates a wide applicability of the theory of revision games. First, we present various applications of the revision game; exchange of goods, price competition, and …
We study a multi-agent search problem with a deadline: for instance, the situation that arises when a husband and a wife need to find an apartment by September 1. We provide an …
Y Kamada, T Sugaya - University of California Berkeley, mimeo, 2014 - ykamada.com
Over the course of election campaigns, candidates often use ambiguous language to describe their policies in the early stages of the campaign, and sometimes clarify their …
We study a class of games in which the timing of players' moves is private information, but players have the option to disclose their actions by incurring a small cost. Payoffs net of a …
This thesis contains three chapters related to the microeconomic interactions in markets. The first paper deals with markets with many participants, and in which monetary transfers are …