Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver
so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has …

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender has to design a signaling scheme that
discloses the right amount of information so as to influence the behavior of a self-interested …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing …

Classical auction theory typically focuses on models with exogenous signal structures,
where all auction participants privately know their item valuations. However, practical …

We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive
sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown …

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly
faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on …

We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends
signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the …