Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it …
The notion of a “mental representation” is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of …
To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a state there is something it's …
Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and …
Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The …
D Bourget - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim …
Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the 'aboutness' of …
Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself'–first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se …
Imagine the following scene. A woman stands at the front door of her house. Her daughter has been living in a remote Peruvian village in the Amazon volunteering for the Peace …