We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …

We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder
multi-item auctions for uniform iid valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; …

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg [in Proceedings of the …

We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive
Bayesian auctions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity …

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the
optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the …

Mechanism design has found various applications in today's economy, such as ad auctions
and online markets. The goal of mechanism design is to design a mechanism or system …

In this work we present a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in
additive Bayesian auctions involving multiple items and many bidders whose values for the …

We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive
Bayesian auctions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity …