Disclosure and incentives in teams
We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career
concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational …
concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational …
Certification Design with Common Values
This paper studies certification design and its implications for information disclosure. Our
model features a profit‐maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We …
model features a profit‐maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We …
Robust Advertisement Pricing
We consider the robust pricing problem of an advertising platform that charges a producer
for disclosing hard evidence of product quality to a consumer before trading. Multiple …
for disclosing hard evidence of product quality to a consumer before trading. Multiple …
The Design and Price of Influence
R Boleslavsky, A Kolb - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.03689, 2024 - arxiv.org
A sender has a privately known preference over the action chosen by a receiver. The sender
would like to influence the receiver's decision by providing information, in the form of a …
would like to influence the receiver's decision by providing information, in the form of a …