Urbanization and land property rights

Y Cai, H Selod, J Steinbuks - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2018 - Elsevier
We analyze the joint dynamics of land property rights and urbanization, a key yet
underexplored relation that underpins the process of economic development. Using a …

Multiagent mechanism design without money

SR Balseiro, H Gurkan, P Sun - Operations Research, 2019 - pubsonline.informs.org
We consider a principal repeatedly allocating a single resource in each period to one of
multiple agents, whose values are private, without relying on monetary payments over an …

Finite-horizon equilibria for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games

R Yan, G Santos, X Duan, D Parker… - Uncertainty in …, 2022 - proceedings.mlr.press
We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently
proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a …

Numerical simulation of nonoptimal dynamic equilibrium models

Z Feng, J Miao, A Peralta‐Alva… - International Economic …, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
In this article, we propose a recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation of
nonoptimal dynamic economies. This algorithm builds upon a convergent operator over an …

Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: computing incentives under risk

J Schosser - European Journal of Operational Research, 2019 - Elsevier
In a parsimonious model, we analyze how to obtain consistent incentives when both
principal and agent are risk-averse and when a setting prevails in which the agent may have …

Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems

P Renner, S Scheidegger - Available at SSRN 3282487, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
We introduce a flexible and scalable method for solving discrete-time dynamic incentive
problems with heterogeneous agents and persistent types. Our framework entails a generic …

On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games

C Sleet, Ş Yeltekin - Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016 - Springer
Recursive game theory provides theoretic procedures for computing the equilibrium payoff
or value sets of repeated games and the equilibrium payoff or value correspondences of …

Algorithms for stochastic games with perfect monitoring

D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov - Econometrica, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We study the pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria of stochastic games with
perfect monitoring, geometric discounting, and public randomization. We develop novel …

A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

M Pęski, T Wiseman - Theoretical Economics, 2015 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case
where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition …

[图书][B] A'Pencil Sharpening'Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov - 2016 - bfi.uchicago.edu
We study the subgame perfect equilibria of two player stochastic games with perfect
monitoring and geometric discounting. A novel algorithm is developed for calculating the …