We consider a principal repeatedly allocating a single resource in each period to one of multiple agents, whose values are private, without relying on monetary payments over an …
R Yan, G Santos, X Duan, D Parker… - Uncertainty in …, 2022 - proceedings.mlr.press
We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a …
In this article, we propose a recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation of nonoptimal dynamic economies. This algorithm builds upon a convergent operator over an …
J Schosser - European Journal of Operational Research, 2019 - Elsevier
In a parsimonious model, we analyze how to obtain consistent incentives when both principal and agent are risk-averse and when a setting prevails in which the agent may have …
We introduce a flexible and scalable method for solving discrete-time dynamic incentive problems with heterogeneous agents and persistent types. Our framework entails a generic …
C Sleet, Ş Yeltekin - Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016 - Springer
Recursive game theory provides theoretic procedures for computing the equilibrium payoff or value sets of repeated games and the equilibrium payoff or value correspondences of …
D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov - Econometrica, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We study the pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria of stochastic games with perfect monitoring, geometric discounting, and public randomization. We develop novel …
M Pęski, T Wiseman - Theoretical Economics, 2015 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition …
D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov - 2016 - bfi.uchicago.edu
We study the subgame perfect equilibria of two player stochastic games with perfect monitoring and geometric discounting. A novel algorithm is developed for calculating the …