We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at …
Learning by doing, a change in beliefs (and consequently behaviour) due to experience, is crucial to the adaptive behaviours of organizations as well as the individuals that inhabit …
JY Chen - Journal of Economic Theory, 2022 - Elsevier
This paper proposes a model of how biased individuals update beliefs in the presence of informational ambiguity. Individuals are ambiguous about the actual signal-generating …
BC Schipper - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play …
We consider an ambiguity averse, sophisticated decision maker facing a recurrent decision problem where information is generated endogenously. In this context, we study self …
P Battigalli, N Generoso - Games and Economic Behavior, 2024 - Elsevier
The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' …
M Pahlke - Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 - Elsevier
This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about states or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief …
We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their …
P Battigalli, N De Vito - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
We adopt the epistemic framework of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) to model the distinction between a player's behavior at each node, which is part of the external state, and …