We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …
EM Azevedo, JD Leshno - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …
AE Roth - international Journal of game Theory, 2008 - Springer
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching …
Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real …
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be …
M Ostrovsky - American Economic Review, 2008 - aeaweb.org
This paper studies matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two- sided markets. It gives sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks and presents …
We introduce a two‐sided, many‐to‐one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts …
JW Hatfield, F Kojima - Journal of Economic theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral …
A Abdulkadiroğlu - International Journal of Game Theory, 2005 - Springer
This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant …