Sub-channel assignment, power allocation, and user scheduling for non-orthogonal multiple access networks

B Di, L Song, Y Li - IEEE transactions on wireless …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In this paper, we study the resource allocation and user scheduling problem for a downlink
non-orthogonal multiple access network where the base station allocates spectrum and …

Matching with contracts

JW Hatfield, PR Milgrom - American Economic Review, 2005 - aeaweb.org
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the
college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …

A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

EM Azevedo, JD Leshno - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous
preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …

Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions

AE Roth - international Journal of game Theory, 2008 - Springer
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a
profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching …

Matching with (branch‐of‐choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy

T Sönmez, TB Switzer - Econometrica, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase
their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real …

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

F Echenique, J Oviedo - Theoretical economics, 2006 - econstor.eu
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions
under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be …

Stability in supply chain networks

M Ostrovsky - American Economic Review, 2008 - aeaweb.org
This paper studies matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-
sided markets. It gives sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks and presents …

Matching with slot‐specific priorities: Theory

SD Kominers, T Sönmez - Theoretical Economics, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a two‐sided, many‐to‐one matching with contracts model in which agents with
unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts …

Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

JW Hatfield, F Kojima - Journal of Economic theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we
introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral …

College admissions with affirmative action

A Abdulkadiroğlu - International Journal of Game Theory, 2005 - Springer
This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist
any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant …