▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across
countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to …

This paper evaluates the importance of “property rights institutions,” which protect citizens
against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions,” …

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …

European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of
generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and …

Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across …

This article proposes a classification of 'slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions, and
discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving …

We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital
performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public …

A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the
relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three …

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for
why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the …