We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model
of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a …

Formal presidential authority does not always translate into real influence over policy
outcomes: The bureaucratic actors that are responsible for policy implementation have …

Theories of political accountability often consider voter-politician interactions in isolation
from politician-bureaucrat interactions. We study a model of electoral accountability with a …

Formal theories of accountability and bureaucratic politics typically consider voter-politician
interactions in isolation from politician-bureaucrat interactions. In this paper, we study a …

A substantial literature has been devoted to analyzing how legislators delegate regulatory
power to a more knowledgeable agency. Yet, much less attention has been paid to …

We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model
of delegated policy-making between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist leaders prefer …

This article examines how unpredictable leadership turnover influences the distribution of
public goods, using novel data from China's municipal procurement and mayoral career …