Multiwinner voting: A new challenge for social choice theory

P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko… - … in computational social …, 2017 - books.google.com
There are many reasons why societies run elections. For example, a given society may need
to select its leader (eg, a president), members of a team may need to find an appropriate …

[PDF][PDF] Do we need hundreds of classifiers to solve real world classification problems?

M Fernández-Delgado, E Cernadas, S Barro… - The journal of machine …, 2014 - jmlr.org
We evaluate 179 classifiers arising from 17 families (discriminant analysis, Bayesian, neural
networks, support vector machines, decision trees, rule-based classifiers, boosting, bagging …

Properties of multiwinner voting rules

E Elkind, P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko - Social Choice and Welfare, 2017 - Springer
A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a mapping that takes a collection of
strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets …

[图书][B] Multi-winner voting with approval preferences

M Lackner, P Skowron - 2023 - library.oapen.org
From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice,
this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based …

Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view

C Boutilier, I Caragiannis, S Haber, T Lu… - Proceedings of the 13th …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
We adopt a utilitarian perspective on social choice, assuming that agents have (possibly
latent) utility functions over some space of alternatives. For many reasons one might …

Liquid democracy: An algorithmic perspective

A Kahng, S Mackenzie, A Procaccia - Journal of Artificial Intelligence …, 2021 - jair.org
We study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm that allows voters to
transitively delegate their votes, through an algorithmic lens. In our model, there are two …

[PDF][PDF] Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy

EN Zalta, U Nodelman, C Allen… - See http://plato. stanford …, 2002 - academia.edu
After an introductory section, this article will focus on four questions: How should the Kyoto
School be defined? What is meant by its central philosophical concept of “absolute …

Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences

E Anshelevich, O Bhardwaj, E Elkind, J Postl… - Artificial Intelligence, 2018 - Elsevier
We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and alternatives are associated
with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers alternatives that are closer to her to …

Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey

E Elkind, M Lackner, D Peters - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09092, 2022 - arxiv.org
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

Computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss - Multiagent systems, 2012 - books.google.com
Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …