Calibrated forecasting and persuasion
How should an expert send forecasts to maximize her utility subject to passing a calibration
test? We consider a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a …
test? We consider a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a …
[PDF][PDF] Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive consumer
V Jain, M Whitmeyer - 2020 - seriindiadotorg.wordpress.com
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients
often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We …
often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We …
Competing to persuade a rationally inattentive agent
V Jain, M Whitmeyer - arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.09255, 2019 - arxiv.org
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients
often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We …
often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We …
Essays on games of strategic information disclosure
V Jain - 2021 - repositories.lib.utexas.edu
This dissertation studies communication and information design in strategic settings. In each
chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to study an interaction where a decision-maker …
chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to study an interaction where a decision-maker …