Transaction fee mechanism design

T Roughgarden - Journal of the ACM, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply,
necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include “on-chain” from …

Foundations of transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, E Shi - Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM …, 2023 - SIAM
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to
get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the …

Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, T Roughgarden, E Shi - … of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …

Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - International Conference on …, 2024 - Springer
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Barriers to collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms

Y Gafni, A Yaish - Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee
mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden (2021) asks whether there is a TFM that is …

Understand waiting time in transaction fee mechanism: An interdisciplinary perspective

L Zhang, F Zhang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02552, 2023 - arxiv.org
Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party.
The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well …

Breaking the traditional: a survey of algorithmic mechanism design applied to economic and complex environments

Q Chen, X Wang, ZL Jiang, Y Wu, H Li, L Cui… - Neural Computing and …, 2023 - Springer
The mechanism design theory can be applied not only in the economy but also in many
fields, such as politics and military affairs, which has important practical and strategic …

Optimality despite chaos in fee markets

S Leonardos, D Reijsbergen, B Monnot… - … Conference on Financial …, 2023 - Springer
Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve
the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In early …

Maximizing miner revenue in transaction fee mechanism design

K Wu, E Shi, H Chung - arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.12895, 2023 - arxiv.org
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem
where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the …

[PDF][PDF] Greedy transaction fee mechanisms for (non-) myopic miners

Y Gafni, A Yaish - arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.07793, 2022 - researchgate.net
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [66] and Ethereum [10] facilitate money transactions
between users by relying on a decentralized process in which miners collect such …