The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet
disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and …

Coalition governance in South Africa is adjudged as an opportunity for nation-building and
social compact, which intends to jettison the apartheid legacy of racial and social separation …

Why do some countries succeed while others struggle? Why are some firms profitable while
rivals fail? Why do some marriages thrive and others end in divorce? These questions seem …

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient
delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral …

We study commitment strategies in adversarial bargaining—situations in which the proposer
demands payment from the responder under the threat of a conflict. The bargaining …

We construct a parametric family of (modified) divide-the-dollar games: when there is excess
demand, some portion of the dollar may disappear and the remaining portion is distributed …

We expand the canonical bargaining framework from the economics literature to incorporate
the process of integrative negotiation, a phase in negotiation that has received significant …

A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. The buyer's value is common
knowledge and the seller has private information about his production cost. In the beginning …

Should a political leader first focus on smaller policy goals or start with the most ambitious
policy agenda? We model a political leader who chooses the policy agenda and proposes …

We consider the canonical frequent-offer Rubinstein bargaining game between two leaders
on a policy issue. The public sentiment on this issue leans toward one leader or the other …