Data-driven contract design
J Burkett, M Rosenthal - Journal of Economic Theory, 2024 - Elsevier
We propose a prior-free model of incentive contracting in which the principal's beliefs about
the agent's production technology are characterized by revealed preference data. The …
the agent's production technology are characterized by revealed preference data. The …
[PDF][PDF] Proper Robustness and the Efficiency of Monopoly Screening
A Kambhampati - ashwinkambhampati.github.io
This paper proposes a refinement of the maxmin criterion for decision making under
uncertainty—proper robustness—and characterizes its implications in a canonical monopoly …
uncertainty—proper robustness—and characterizes its implications in a canonical monopoly …
[PDF][PDF] Robust Contracting under Distributional Uncertainty
J Li, K Wang - 2024 - economics.smu.edu.sg
We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about
the output distributions induced by the agent's actions. In the baseline model, we consider a …
the output distributions induced by the agent's actions. In the baseline model, we consider a …