Contrary to signaling models' central predictions, changes in the level of cash flows do not
empirically follow changes in dividends. We use the Campbell (1991) decomposition to …

We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling
depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief …

This article investigates how a privately informed seller could signal her type through
Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy. We find that it is generally impossible to achieve …

We develop a unified treatment of truthful disclosure (persuasion) games, providing a joint
framework that nests, among other models, unraveling theory, costly disclosure, uncertainty …

Contrary to the central predictions of signaling models, changes in profits do not empirically
follow changes in dividends, and firms with the least need to signal pay the bulk of …

We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a
privately informed principal can implement a contract that is ex-ante optimal for her. As an …

We introduce a solution concept for signaling games, called Rational Hypothesis Testing
Equilibrium (RHTE). Beliefs are updated via Ortoleva's (2012) Hypothesis Testing model …

We study a class of signaling games in which one of the signals induces the receiver to take
an action that provides the sender with the highest utility. This class of games has multiple …

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk
refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the …

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