We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and
compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational …

We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a
generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is …

A group of agents controls a common budget or owns some common resources. The agents
need to decide how to divide this budget across various projects, or to distribute the …

We study two concepts of proportionality in the model of approval-based committee
elections. In degressive proportionality small minorities of voters are favored in comparison …

We study the PAC learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based
committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval …

Participatory Budgeting (PB) offers a democratic process for communities to allocate public
funds across various projects through voting. In practice, PB organizers face challenges in …

We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within the
computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and …

Electoral spoilers are such agents that there exists a coalition of agents whose total gain
when a putative spoiler is eliminated exceeds that spoiler's share in the election outcome …

We consider the problem of selecting a committee that represents the voters proportionally.
One way of finding such a committee is to apply the Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule …

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and
compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational …