We review the accounting literature on innovation, focusing on the economic attributes of
innovation that collectively differentiate innovation from other assets: novelty, nonrivalry, and …

We study how corporate boards set earnings performance targets in CEOs' annual incentive
plans (AIPs) and the implications for strategic management earning guidance. We find that …

Effective corporate decision-making requires information. However, relevant information is
dispersed among multiple agents and is not concentrated in the hands of decisionmakers …

We study the optimal dynamic contract that provides incentives for an agent (eg, SPAC
sponsor, VC general partner, CTO) to exploit investment opportunities/targets that arrive …

We study how the precision of managers' private post-contract pre-decision information
affects the pay–performance relation. Endogenizing the information environment, we find …

In this study, we investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the
likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous …

This paper examines how whistleblowing incentives shape a firm's internal information
system design. We study a model in which a manager commits to an information system ex …

We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can
incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases …

A crucial requirement for firms to remain competitive is to consistently and simultaneously
engage in exploratory and exploitative activities. The academic literature has broadly …

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to
and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions …