The aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four
decades following Nordhaus's (Rev Econ Stud 42 (2): 169–190, 1975) publication on …

▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …

We examine the ways in which political realities shape industrial policy through the lens of
modern political economy. We consider two broad “governance constraints”:(1) the political …

This article introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure central bank
independence (CBI), including yearly data from 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The …

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing,
and recovering their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the …

Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a
society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to …

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public
goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government …

This paper examines the empirical relationship between long-run growth and financial
development, proxied by the ratio between bank credit to the private sector and GDP. We …

This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate
in office as a result of elections. Government debt is used strategically by each policymaker …