Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to
provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game …

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of
employee–employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk …

What makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding
commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context …

This paper studies the extent to which offers and demands in ultimatum games are
consistent with equity theory when there is a joint endowment to be distributed. Using a …

Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in
organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new …

In past experiments involving a wide range of bargaining settings, individuals exploited their
bargaining position less fully than standard theory predicts. Typically, these experiments …

Experimental Economics: Volume II: Economic Applications Page 1 EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS Vºlume II: Economic Applications Pablo Branas-Garza Antonio Cabrales Page 2 …

Empirical evidence indicates that females earn lower wages than men with similar abilities,
and that there are fewer women in management positions than in administrative ones. In this …

We investigate whether the price paid for insurance explains dishonesty in reporting an
insurance claim. In our laboratory experiment, participants earn money in a real‐effort task …

We examine how sharing information about outside obligations impacts wage negotiations.
We consider an 'employee'with an outside obligation, whose performance determines the …