I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An
intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score …

Data-based decision making must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are
aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a …

Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show
that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication …

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling
environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on …

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power:
before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability …

A university uses both early‐stage selection outcome (high‐school affiliation) and late‐stage
admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to …

We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly commit to not
view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their …

This paper examines the impact of informational frictions when the entrepreneur anticipates
having little or no bargaining power in negotiating with the financier and can select ex ante …

Infamously, the presence of honest communication in a signaling environment may be
difficult to reconcile with small (relative) signaling costs or a low degree of common interest …

This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with
vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria …