Measuring agents' reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities
C Cornand, F Heinemann - Experimental Economics, 2014 - Springer
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world
has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision …
has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision …
Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures: theory and experiment
R Baeriswyl, C Cornand - Journal of the European Economic …, 2014 - academic.oup.com
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can
reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to only a fraction of market …
reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to only a fraction of market …
[PDF][PDF] GROUPE D'ANALYSE ET DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE LYON-‐ST ÉTIENNE
C Cornand, F Heinemann - 2013 - Citeseer
One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress
in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic …
in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic …
[PDF][PDF] orking Papers
R Baeriswyl, C Cornand - 2012 - snb.ch
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can
reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants …
reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants …
[引用][C] Measuring agents' reaction to public information in games with strategic complementarities'
C Cornand, F Heinemann - 2009 - mimeo