I study a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game in which a buyer can choose to learn
privately about her value of the good. Information generation takes time and is endogenous …

We analyze technology investment and adoption by a product developer who faces
uncertainty over whether any existing patent covers a new technology. If there is a patent …

Individuals convey information through the messages that they send, and—just as
importantly—through the messages they do not send. In this dissertation, I focus on two …

I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in plea bargaining. A
prosecutor negotiates a sentence with a defendant who privately knows whether he is guilty …

We study novel multi-stage bargaining games that differ in the timing and efficiency of
Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) outcomes, but include the possibility of an …

We consider a bargaining game in which both sides are uncertain about their opponent's
commitment, which leads to delay and welfare loss in equilibrium. We address the following …

We introduce a model of competitive equilibrium in a market for a divisible good in which
both buyer and seller may possess concealable hard information about the state of the …

This dissertation examines the role of negotiations in different institutional settings. In
chapter one, I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in plea …

This dissertation examines the role of negotiations in different institutional settings. In
chapter one, I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in plea …

In markets for credence goods buyers rely on expert sellers for diagnosis and treatment. This
gives sellers incentives to provide buyers with unnecessary services. We theoretically study …