We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets
of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional ε‐equilibrium if, for any of a player's …

In a matrix game, the interactions among players are based on the assumption that each
player has accurate information about the payoffs of their interactions and the other players …

For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-
Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing …

Monotone equilibria may be undesirable in Bayesian games in the sense that players adopt
weakly dominated strategies. To account for the possibility that the players might choose …

This paper extends Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection to
normal-form games of incomplete information and provides conditions on the primitives of a …

In second-price auctions with interdependent values, bidders do not necessarily have
dominant strategies. Moreover, such auctions may have many equilibria. In order to rule out …

We develop concepts of conditional equilibria to extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of
sequential equilibrium to games where the sets of actions that players can choose and the …

In second-price auctions with interdependent values, bidders do not necessarily have
dominant strategies. Moreover, such auctions may have many equilibria. In order to rule out …