Managerial risk-taking incentive and firm innovation: Evidence from FAS 123R
CX Mao, C Zhang - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2018 - cambridge.org
We investigate how chief executive officers'(CEOs) risk incentive (VEGA) affects firm
innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS …
innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS …
CEO Pay Disparity: Efficient Contracting or CEO Entrenchment?
T Vo, J Canil - Available at SSRN 2580590, 2015 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper investigates whether CEO pay disparity reflects efficient contracting or CEO
entrenchment by exploiting an exogenous event which mandated option expensing, namely …
entrenchment by exploiting an exogenous event which mandated option expensing, namely …
[PDF][PDF] Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives
M Amadeus - 2015 - core.ac.uk
A growing body of evidence shows that equity components of executive compensation,
originally designed to mitigate agency costs within a firm, may, instead, exacerbate the …
originally designed to mitigate agency costs within a firm, may, instead, exacerbate the …
[PDF][PDF] Does Hedging A ect Firm Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
EP Gilje, JP Taillard - 2014 - ou.edu
We study the channels through which financial hedging affects firm value. To mitigate
endogeneity concerns, we use a natural experiment in which Canadian light oil producers …
endogeneity concerns, we use a natural experiment in which Canadian light oil producers …
[引用][C] On the Market Timing and Feedback Effect of “Hedging”: Evidence from US Oil and Gas Producers
Y Li, K Xie