This paper explores a scenario where a decision maker evaluates bundles by adding up the
utility of the options that attract her attention. We introduce a novel attention rule called the …

In a two-stage model of choice a decision maker first shortlists a given menu and then
applies her preferences. We show that a sizeable class of these models run into significant …

Delegating future choices can involve various hidden costs for planners who need to select
and motivate doers to execute these choices. Providing suitable incentives—such as …

When facing a decision problem, people usually fail to consider all available options
because consideration can be time-consuming or mentally exhausting. Instead, they may …

We model choices of a person (a doer) whose preferences and considerations sets can be
strategically manipulated by another agent (a planner) via costly unobserved incentives …

This dissertation consists of three essays that study heterogeneous preferences in economic
activities and their implications for welfare. Chapter one axiomatizes the choice behavior …

We model a broad range of incentives that one person (called a planner) can use to affect
choices of another agent (called a doer). For instance, a planner can regulate her own future …