We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with
promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We …

In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with incomplete
information. Two symmetric players have either high or low private value. The contest …

We use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of disclosing the number of active
participants in contests with endogenous entry. At the first stage, potential participants …

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private
information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of …

A contestant's effort depends on her knowledge of her rival's type. This knowledge is often
limited in real-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has …

This paper investigates whether a contest organizer should disclose private information
about bidders' abilities in a multi-prize all-pay auction. Bidders' abilities are randomly …

We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political
competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule …

We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations.
To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an …

Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which
the players' cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function …

We consider a two‐player rent‐seeking Tullock contest where one player has private
information about his valuation of the prize, which can be high or low. This player can send a …