Decision Analysis: The Right Tool for Auctions Page 1 Decision Analysis Vol. 04, No. 3,
September 2007, pp. 167–172 issn 1545-8490eissn 1545-85040704030167 informs® doi …

Abstract We describe a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction for supply and demand bidding in the
face of market power and nonconcave benefits in which bidders are motivated to bid …

A widespread practice, particularly in public-sector procurement and dispersal, is to
subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage. Arguments for …

Although most bidding theory deals with one-shot auctions, daily repetition of auctions can
have a major effect on how they proceed. An analysis using available theory enhances the …

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private
goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism …

We present an alternative abstraction of an English (oral ascending) auction to the standard,
in Milgrom and Weber (1982), that accords more closely with practices in some auction …

This essay assesses the state of auction theory in a particular dimension: its relevance to
practice. Most auction models are more abstract than necessary. They depend on …

Existence of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in models with multi-dimensional
signals and interdependent values is possible when there are no consumption externalities …

Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
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This paper argues that the answers to interesting questions about real auctions depend,
often critically, on the particular mathematical assumptions that go into a model of an auction …