[HTML][HTML] Stable cores in information graph games
M Núñez, J Vidal-Puga - Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 - Elsevier
In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of
an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no …
an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no …
[HTML][HTML] Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Abstract Pillage games (Jordan, 2006a) have two features that make them richer than
cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power …
cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power …
Asymmetric majority pillage games
We study pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131 (1): 26–44, 2006), which model
unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of pillage game theory, we relax a …
unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of pillage game theory, we relax a …