Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that
learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic …

Individuals must often choose among discrete actions with imperfect information about their
payoffs. Before choosing, they have an opportunity to study the payoffs, but doing so is …

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent
considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention …

The network pattern of financial linkages is important in many areas of banking and finance.
Yet, bilateral linkages are often unobserved, and maximum entropy serves as the leading …

We solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent
repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The …

Perturbed utility functions—the sum of expected utility and a nonlinear perturbation function—
provide a simple and tractable way to model various sorts of stochastic choice. We provide …

The concept of free energy has its origins in 19th century thermodynamics, but has recently
found its way into the behavioral and neural sciences, where it has been promoted for its …

We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning
dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us …

We examine the role of stochastic feasibility in consumer choice using a random conditional
choice set rule (RCCSR) and uniquely characterize the model from conditions on stochastic …

This paper provides nonparametric identification results for a class of latent utility models
with additively separable unobservable heterogeneity. These results apply to existing …