Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice

F Brandt - Trends in computational social choice, 2017 - books.google.com
When aggregating the preferences of multiple agents into one collective choice, it is easily
seen that certain cases call for randomization or other means of tiebreaking. For example, if …

When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

V Conitzer, T Sandholm, J Lang - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2007 - dl.acm.org
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation
is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results …

A short introduction to computational social choice

Y Chevaleyre, U Endriss, J Lang, N Maudet - International conference on …, 2007 - Springer
Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social
choice theory and computer science, promoting an exchange of ideas in both directions. On …

Computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss - Multiagent systems, 2012 - books.google.com
Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …

How hard is bribery in elections?

P Faliszewski, E Hemaspaandra… - Journal of artificial …, 2009 - jair.org
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally
complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change …

Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders

L Xia, V Conitzer - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2011 - jair.org
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in
some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has …

[PDF][PDF] Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings

V Conitzer, A Davenport, J Kalagnanam - AAAI, 2006 - cdn.aaai.org
Voting (or rank aggregation) is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple
agents. One voting rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which minimizes the …

AI's war on manipulation: Are we winning?

P Faliszewski, AD Procaccia - AI Magazine, 2010 - ojs.aaai.org
AI Magazine Page 1 It was a late evening in Bitotia. The next day was going to be a big day:
Citizens of Bitotia would once and for all establish which byte order was better, big-endian (B) …

Using complexity to protect elections

P Faliszewski, E Hemaspaandra… - Communications of the …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Using complexity to protect elections Page 1 74 communications of the acm | november
2010 | vol. 53 | no. 11 review articles IL Lu s t r a t Io n B y m e LV In g a L a p o n For …

Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries

V Conitzer - Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent
ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the …