Designing incentives for heterogeneous researchers
N Yoder - Journal of Political Economy, 2022 - journals.uchicago.edu
A principal (eg, the US government) contracts with a researcher with unknown costs (eg, a
vaccine developer) to conduct a costly experiment. This contracting problem has a novel …
vaccine developer) to conduct a costly experiment. This contracting problem has a novel …
Buying opinions
M Whitmeyer, K Zhang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.05249, 2022 - arxiv.org
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though
neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the …
neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the …
Procuring unverifiable information
We study settings where information in the form of Bayesian signals is acquired by an expert
on behalf of a principal. Information acquisition is costly for the expert and crucially not …
on behalf of a principal. Information acquisition is costly for the expert and crucially not …
Optimal Reward Scheme in Private Exploration with Conclusive News
W Fu - Available at SSRN 4992405 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper studies the design of an optimal reward scheme by a principal, aiming to
incentivize an uninformed agent to privately explore a project's quality through sequential …
incentivize an uninformed agent to privately explore a project's quality through sequential …