On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others.
Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk …

Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the
view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form" S knows …

Contextualism in epistemology has traditionally been understood as the view that “know”
functions semantically like an indexical term, encoding different contents in contexts with …

Skeptical invariantism does not account for the intuitive connections between knowledge,
assertion, and practical reasoning and this constitutes a significant problem for the position …

In this chapter, I consider the prospects for a skeptical version of infallibilism. I think skeptical
invariantism has a lot going for it (it easily explains many of the key desiderata of a theory of …

An argument often leveled against skeptical invariantism (SI) is–what we may call–'the
argument from semantic awareness'. Roughly, the argument suggests that ordinary agents …

It is all but universally accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive: S knows that p
only if p. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument against the factivity of …

Positions in the debate about the correct semantics of “S knows that p” are sometimes
motivated in part by an appeal to interpretive charity. In particular, non-skeptical views hold …

An important step in building an account of the knowledge of what things are is to recognize
that knowledge of this sort is a species of knowledge-wh, which includes, for example …

ABSTRACT I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for
being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic …