[HTML][HTML] Sustainable finance versus environmental policy: Does greenwashing justify a taxonomy for sustainable investments?

R Inderst, MM Opp - Journal of financial economics, 2025 - Elsevier
Our paper analyzes whether a planner should design a taxonomy for sustainable investment
products when conventional tools for environmental regulation can also be used to address …

Beyond pigou: Disclosure and the green transition of markets

J Manili - Available at SSRN 4529222, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
Disclosure of most product attributes related to environmental quality is not mandatory, and
consumers have to rely on the information strategically disclosed by manufacturers to form …

Greenwashing and Retail investors: The case for a Taxonomy for ESG Investments?

R Inderst, MM Opp - Available at SSRN 4749028, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Our paper analyzes whether a planner should design a taxonomy for sustainable investment
products when conventional tools for environmental regulation can also be used to address …

Socially Optimal Eligibility Criteria for ESG Funds

R Inderst, MM Opp - Swedish House of Finance Research Paper …, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
Our paper analyzes whether and how a planner should design a taxonomy for sustainable
investment products in the presence of traditional tools for environmental regulation. Barring …

Dynamic Green Disclosure Requirements

D Gupta, J Starmans - Available at SSRN 4557187, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper studies the design of green disclosure requirements to support firms' green
transition. In our dynamic model with socially responsible investors, firms' green transition is …

Optimism and voluntary disclosure: A theory of corporate greenwashing

J Manili - Available at SSRN 4704323, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Corporate disclosures on environmental performance rest on voluntary certifications like
labels. The paper shows important issues of greenwashing in this system in a voluntary …

Incentivizing Agents through Ratings

P Xiao - arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.10525, 2024 - arxiv.org
I study the optimal design of ratings to motivate agent investment in quality when transfers
are unavailable. The principal designs a rating scheme that maps the agent's quality to a …

[PDF][PDF] Selling Tests under Moral Hazard

P Xiao - 2023 - files.peiranxiao.com
I study how a monopoly certifier designs and prices the quality certification to maximize
revenue when agents' quality is endogenous. The certifier designs the quality certification …

[引用][C] Selling Tests with Moral Hazard

P Xiao - 2023 - … . com/InfoDesign/tests. pdf.[45, 74]