Most informal finance comes from family and friends. Existing informal finance theories
cannot match two characteristics of family finance: family investors may accept below-market …

This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational
incentive contracts. To this end, we develop a simple dynamic principal–agent model where …

We analyze the effect of social ties between a provincial leader and provincial elites on
governance in China. Using panel data for 26 years, we show that party secretaries who …

We analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an
agent. The supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent, but his preferences are …

Protecting environment has become a vital responsibility for corporations. Based on
manually collected data of China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017, this study …

We study a bonus pay setting where a principal hires a supervisor to evaluate a group of
potentially shirking workers. The supervisor and her workers develop relational feelings …

This paper analyzes firms¡¯ choice of replacement CEOs after unexpected CEO turnovers,
and the impact of the replacement decision on shareholder wealth. More specifically, I …

This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked
executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect
relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent …