We investigate how bonus payments affect the satisfaction and performance of managers in a large multinational company. We find that falling behind a natural reference standard for a …
We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation …
E Karagözoğlu, ÜB Urhan - Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017 - Springer
We review the literature on bargaining and distribution experiments to investigate whether changes in stake size have significant effects on behaviour in laboratory/field settings. We …
A Wolitzky - American Economic Review, 2023 - aeaweb.org
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players' preferences are common …
Experimental data for two types of bargaining games are used to study the role of strategic risk in the decision making process that takes place when subjects play a game only once …
W Güth, O Kirchkamp - Experimental Economics, 2012 - Springer
In this paper we compare behaviour in a newspaper experiment with behaviour in the laboratory. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the …
N Chlaß, W Güth, T Miettinen - European Journal of Political Economy, 2019 - Elsevier
We conduct experiments in which parties face a pair of two-player pie-splitting procedures. Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are …
GE Bolton, A Ockenfels - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014 - Elsevier
Laboratory market experiments observe a sharp dichotomy between (selfish) competitive behavior and fair-minded social behavior depending on competitive conditions. While the …
N Anbarcı, N Feltovich, MY Gürdal - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2015 - Elsevier
We introduce the taxicab game, related to the ultimatum game and Gehrig et al.'s (2007) yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk …