Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers

S Betton, BE Eckbo - The Review of Financial Studies, 2000 - academic.oup.com
We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first,
second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly …

Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle

S Betton, BE Eckbo, KS Thorburn - Journal of Financial Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
The substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a
compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid …

Do tender offers create value? New methods and evidence

S Bhagat, M Dong, D Hirshleifer, R Noah - Journal of Financial Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
Conventional techniques of estimating takeover value improvements measure only a
fraction of the total gain and include revelation about bidder stand-alone value. To address …

Takeover bidding with toeholds: The case of the owner's curse

R Singh - The Review of Financial Studies, 1998 - academic.oup.com
This article demonstrates that a potential acquirer with a toehold bids aggressively and
possibly overpays in equilibrium. The aggressiveness of a bidder with a toehold increases …

Merger negotiations with stock market feedback

S Betton, BE Eckbo, R Thompson… - The Journal of …, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
Do preoffer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present model‐
based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about …

Takeovers and divergence of investor opinion

S Chatterjee, K John, A Yan - The Review of Financial Studies, 2012 - academic.oup.com
We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of
opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the pre …

Takeover contests with asymmetric bidders

P Povel, R Singh - The Review of Financial Studies, 2006 - academic.oup.com
Target firms often face bidders that are not equally well informed, which reduces
competition, because bidders with less information fear the winner's curse more. We analyze …

Locking out rival bidders: the use of lockup options in corporate mergers

TR Burch - Journal of Financial Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
Conventional wisdom suggests that lockup options are granted by self-interested target
managers to discourage competition and hand-select an acquirer, thus harming target …

[图书][B] Takeovers

M Burkart, F Panunzi - 2008 - eprints.lse.ac.uk
The development and integration of financial markets is at the forefront of academic and
policy debates around the world. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in Europe where …

[图书][B] Fusions acquisitions-4e ed.: Stratégie. Finance. Management

O Meier, G Schier - 2012 - books.google.com
Ce manuel propose une approche pluridisciplinaire des fusions et acquisitions. Cette 4e
édition, entièrement réactualisée, met l'accent sur les étapes critiques d'un processus de …