N Block - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2013 - pdcnet.org
I am grateful to Bradley Richards (2013) and JH Taylor (2013) for their thoughtful critiques and for the chance to clarify and re-think the main line of argument in ''The Grain of Vision …
H Taylor, B Sayim - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
Some have claimed that identity crowding is a case where we consciously see an object to which we are unable to pay attention. Opponents of this view offer alternative explanations …
H Taylor, B Sayim - Mind & Language, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
One of the most important topics in current work on consciousness is what relationship it has to attention. Recently, one of the focuses of this debate has been on the phenomenon of …
M Tye - Thought: a journal of philosophy, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
Ned Block says 'yes'(,). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity‐crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity‐crowding, something is consciously seen even …
A Prettyman - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
In cases of identity crowding, a subject consciously sees items in a figure, even though they are presented too closely together for her to shift attention to each item. Block (2012, 2013) …
B Richards - Philosophical Psychology, 2016 - Taylor & Francis
Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity- crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role …
B Richards - Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2015 - ingentaconnect.com
Introspective subjective reports cannot provide direct evidence that phenomenal experience overflows cognitive access. This problem for the overflow view is underappreciated in …
538 Ned Block notes, many beliefs and intentions can be quiescent but potentially able to control thought and action. I put it this way:“One reason for choosing 'poised for access' …
E Demircioglu - Theoria, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non‐epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske …