This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We
start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and …

This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We
begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab experiment the …

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing
them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader …

The chapter has ten sections, which cover the theory of two-sided markets and related
empirical work. Section 1 introduces the reader to the literature. Section 2 covers the case of …

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in a
project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are …

A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses
contingent on team success. We study the principal's optimal incentive scheme that …

In this paper we address the general question of how social influence determines collective
outcomes for large populations of individuals faced with binary decisions. First, we define …

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public
information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and …

A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the
capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on …

This paper surveys the literature on theories of discrimination, focusing mainly on new
contributions. Recent theories expand on the traditional taste-based and statistical …