In this chapter, we describe code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new design point that guarantees
the integrity of all code pointers in a program (eg, function pointers, saved return addresses) …

The constant-time programming discipline is an effective countermeasure against timing
attacks, which can lead to complete breaks of otherwise secure systems. However, adhering …

Current Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) implementations track control edges individually,
insensitive to the context of preceding edges. Recent work demonstrates that this leaves …

Control flow integrity (CFI) has been proposed as an approach to defend against control-
hijacking memory corruption attacks. CFI works by assigning tags to indirect branch targets …

We present the DOOP framework for points-to analysis of Java programs. DOOP builds on
the idea of specifying pointer analysis algorithms declaratively, using Datalog: a logic-based …

We present a new system, KCoFI, that is the first we know of to provide complete Control-
Flow Integrity protection for commodity operating systems without using heavyweight …

Building safety-critical real-time systems out of inexpensive, non-real-time, COTS
components is challenging. Although COTS components generally offer high performance …

Heap data is potentially unbounded and seemingly arbitrary. Hence, unlike stack and static
data, heap data cannot be abstracted in terms of a fixed set of program variables. This …

Adversaries exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to hijack a program's control flow and
gain arbitrary code execution. One promising mitigation, control-flow integrity (CFI), has …

Attacks that exploit out-of-bounds errors in C and C++ programs are still prevalent despite
many years of research on bounds checking. Previous backwards compatible bounds …