We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the
extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' …

We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the
behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a …

We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose
her action set from a menu of options. We fully characterize for a large class of settings the …

This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous
coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common …

We consider an extensive-form game in which players have the option to commit to actions
before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make …

We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action
space determine her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting …

抄録 本研究は, 望ましい学校制度のあり方に関連する経済学的問題を 2 つ取り上げ,
ミクロ経済学のアプローチで考察する. 1 つは, 学校教育の現場で生じがちな,「皆で協力すれば …