The design and verification of cryptographic protocols is a notoriously difficult task, even in
abstract Dolev-Yao models. This is mainly due to several sources of unboundedness (size of …

Abstract We formalize the Dolev-Yao model of security protocols using two different
notations, one based on multiset rewriting with existentials, and the other based on a …

This paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete
implementations of security protocols by introducing a quantitative extension of the usual …

We propose a protocol model which integrates two different ways of analyzing cryptographic
protocols: i) analysis wrt an unbounded number of sessions and bounded message size …

While the verification of security protocols has been proved to be undecidable in general,
several approaches use simplifying hypotheses in order to obtain decidability for interesting …

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif. CryptoVerif does not rely
on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy …

Abstract We formalize the Dolev–Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on
multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for …

We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast
to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the …

We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that
tosses coins in addition to standard cryptographic primitives against a Dolev-Yao adversary …

Cryptographic protocols can be divided into (1) protocols where the protocol steps are
simple from a computational point of view and can thus be modeled by simple means, for …